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Since the financial crash of 2008, monetary policy has been in a state of stasis – a condition in which things are 
not changing, moving or progressing, but rather appear frozen. Interest rates have been frozen at low levels for a 
considerable period time. Inflation targets have consistently been missed, through phases of both overshooting and 
undershooting. At the same time, a variety of unconventional monetary policies involving asset purchases and liquid-
ity provision have been pursued. Questions have been raised from a variety of sources, including various international 
organizations, covering distinct positions taken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Internation-
al Monetary Fund (IMF) about the continuing validity and sustainability of existing monetary policy frameworks, 
not least because inflation targeting has ceased to act as reliable guide for policy for more than six years. Nonetheless, 
central banks have been reluctant to debate moving to a new formal policy framework. This article argues that, as 
an apex policy forum, only the G20 summit has the necessary political authority to call its members’ central banks to 
account and initiate a wide-ranging debate on the future of monetary policy. A case is made for convening a monetary 
policy working group to discuss a range of positions, including those of the BIS and IMF, and to make recommenda-
tions, because the G20 has been most effective in displaying international financial leadership, when leaders have 
convened and made use of specialist working groups.
Key words: G20; monetary policy; inflation targeting; central banks; Bank for International Settlements; 
International Monetary Fund; quantitative easing
Introduction
Since the financial crash of 2008, monetary policy has been in a state of stasis. Interest rates have 
been frozen at low levels for a considerable period time, while inflation targets have been con-
sistently missed, through phases of both overshooting and undershooting. Most central banks 
around the world continue to have a formal commitment to an inflation target, but inflation 
targets have ceased to act as a reliable guide or anchor for policy. Monetary policy regimes have 
not been functioning as intended, as central banks have repeatedly missed their inflation tar-
gets. At the same time, a variety of unconventional monetary policies involving asset purchases 
and liquidity provision have been pursued. Questions have been raised from a variety of sources, 
including various international organizations, about the continuing validity and sustainability 
of existing monetary policy frameworks. Crucially, in many settings, short-term interest rates 
have appeared frozen at close to a zero rate. In the early stages of responding to the 2008 crash, 
many central banks saw inflation creep above their targets. In more recent times, inflation has 
commonly fallen well below the standard 2% target, falling to 1% and below. Consequently, in-
terest rates cannot be cut and used as an expansionary measure. Monetary stimulus is exhausted 
and has probably reached its limits. At the same time, inflation targeting also provides no basis 
for raising rates, as the current data suggest it is falling in most major jurisdictions. Meanwhile, 
* The editorial position does not necessarily ref lect the authors views.
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fears about the adverse effects of rate rises on large scale and widespread indebtedness com-
pound policy caution, while debt continues to grow and financial asset prices remain inflated.
The net impact is that monetary policy has effectively been paralyzed as a tool of macro-
economic management, beyond asset-purchasing policies, which are positions that are now 
beginning to be unwound, as they have reached their limits. The overall result is that monetary 
policy is in a state of stasis, – a condition in which things are not changing, moving or pro-
gressing, but rather appear frozen. Moreover, central banks have been reluctant even to begin 
a debate about moving to a new formal policy framework, despite considerable evidence that 
current formal monetary policy frameworks have ceased to act as a reliable guide to policy. In 
this regard, G20 leaders and their finance ministers could usefully use the G20 mechanism to 
instigate opening up this debate on what the monetary policy frameworks of the future should 
actually look like.
Part of the inertia, or stasis, in the field of monetary policy is an assumption that eventu-
ally monetary policy would return to business as usual, with a medium-term focus on price sta-
bility and low inflation. To date this has not materialized. Six years on from the crash, it is now 
time to question this assumption. The paradox is that while on a day-to-day basis conventional 
monetary policy appears frozen, the fact that existing policy frameworks appear redundant sug-
gests that monetary policy on a broader level is entering a period of f lux and change is in need 
of a fundamental rethink. Central banks themselves have had few institutional incentives to 
reopen debates about monetary policy, because inflation targeting was an integral component 
of hard-won independence. Despite this, evidence is growing that inflation targeting, at least in 
its current form, is unsustainable as a guide for policy and that monetary policy has effectively 
been paralysed as a policy tool in a number of systemically significant jurisdictions. This article 
considers the politics of this monetary policy stasis and considers what role the G20 can play in 
overcoming this stasis and in prompting and instigating a rethink in monetary policy.
This article begins by providing an account of this monetary policy stasis. Second, it con-
trasts the change in assumptions that have occurred in the field of financial regulation evident 
in the rise of macroprudential regulation with the relative inertia and stasis in monetary policy. 
Third, a number of the current criticisms of inflation targeting regimes are recounted, and an 
emerging BIS position is distinguished from an IMF position. Finally, the role the G20 can play 
in overcoming this stasis is examined through the lens of accountability and how the G20 as an 
apex policy forum can call central banks to account and initiate a wide-ranging debate on the 
future of monetary policy, discussing why it makes most sense for the G20 to do this collectively 
rather than for national governments to go it alone [Baker, 2010; Baker and Carey, 2014]. Only 
the G20 summit process possesses the necessary political authority for this task. A case is made 
for convening a monetary policy working group to make recommendations, as the G20 has 
been most effective in displaying international financial leadership, when it has convened and 
made use of specialist working groups.
Global Challenges
Following the financial crash of 2008, the certainties of inflation targeting have disintegrated. 
A focus on price stability provided no guarantee against major financial and macroeconomic 
instability in the period leading up to 2008. Central banks responded by reaching well beyond 
interest-rate policy, aggressively deploying their balance sheet in a variety of “unconventional” 
asset-purchasing policies. The line between monetary and fiscal policy has consequently blurred 
at precisely the time when public sector debts ballooned, due to the macroeconomic slowdown 
induced by the crash and the use of sovereign funds to bail out or support ailing financial insti-
tutions. Central banks’ ability to maintain inflation within stated ranges, and to avoid deflation 
(particularly in the euro zone), is being increasingly questionable by a range of voices, notably 
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the IMF. At the same time, Claudio Borio of the BIS has been critical of some of the underlying 
assumptions behind current monetary policy frameworks, arguing that current macroeconomic 
models provide little guidance to ward off and anticipate financial crisis, with the crisis expos-
ing a chasm between theory and the practice of policy [Borio, 2011a, b].
During the 1990s and in the lead-up to the crash of 2008, a narrow view of central banking 
had taken hold. The focus was on the attainment of price stability through inflation targeting 
and a belief in the self-equilibrating properties of markets. Four propositions were at the core of 
this pre-crash consensus [Borio, 2011b]. First, price stability was seen to be sufficient for mac-
roeconomic stability. By stabilizing inflation over the medium term on two-year time horizons 
the economy was believed to take care of itself. Second, there was a view that monetary policy 
and financial stability could be run as separate policy areas so that monetary policy would take 
care of price stability, while supervision would focus on the soundness of individual institutions 
as a route to financial stability. Moreover, this was increasingly handled by a separate regulatory 
authority, rather than by the central bank. Analytically, the behaviour of the financial system 
and markets was separated from macroeconomic models, which ignored long-run financial cy-
cles over a 15- to 20-year period, and largely discounted financial instability and malfunction-
ing markets. Third, short-term interest rate adjustments were seen to be the primary monetary 
policy instrument and sufficient for monetary policy to play its stabilization role in relation to 
the wider economy. This was based on rational expectations assumptions about the future path 
of interest rates that dismissed the possibility that central banks might drive interest rates to zero 
and largely discounted the Japanese experience. Fourth, these premises were accompanied by 
the doctrine of keeping one’s own house in order. This was the macroeconomic equivalent of 
the microprudential approach in financial regulation that suggested making sure each individ-
ual institution was sound and would translate into system-wide financial stability. In the global 
macroeconomic equivalent, countries replaced individual institutions and the world economy 
substituted for the financial system. All a central bank had to do was to ensure price stability in 
its own economy and let the exchange rate f loat (although it was conceded small open econo-
mies could benefit from pegging their exchange rates).
In the post-crash period, there have been signs of change. First, low inflation is no longer 
recognized as a guarantor of macroeconomic and financial stability. Low inflation, low yields 
and an apparently low risk environment actually encouraged greater private risk taking and ris-
ing leverage in the period leading up to 2007–08. Second, interest rate easing is not sufficient 
to clean the debris left by the financial crash. Central banks have consequently deployed their 
balance sheets to influence broader financial conditions by purchasing government and private 
sector assets and by providing liquidity to the banking sector. Finally, there has also been a 
macroprudential ideational shift. Now regulation focuses on the financial system as a whole, 
and not just on individual institutions, while recognizing the procyclical tendencies of financial 
markets and credit provision, the propensity for herding among investors, and the fragility and 
instability induced by financial complexity in a highly inter-connected financial system [Baker, 
2013b]. Central banks have been given new powers to implement countercyclical policy instru-
ments, such as countercyclical capital buffers, countercyclical liquidity requirements, loan-to-
value ratios and limits on real estate lending. Macroprudential policy is a far more intervention-
ist effort on behalf of central banks to curb financial and credit cycles. In short, it involves using 
prudential measures for macroeconomic means, although the process of building such policy 
regimes has only just started [Haldane, 2014]. Intellectually, this macroprudential position rep-
resents a Gestalt f lip from the pre-crash consensus, which, in the words of Adair Turner [2011] 
chair of the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), derived from a simplified 
version of the efficient markets hypothesis, and had become part of the institutional DNA jus-
tifying light-touch assessments of banks’ own risk management models.
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By and large, central banks have continued to cling to the view that monetary policy should 
focus on price stability, with financial stability the focus of macroprudential policy. In other 
words, the siphoned, siloed nature of monetary policy and financial stability has persisted after 
the crash. Moreover, these two areas are, in the words of one BIS official who played a leading 
role in instigating the macroprudential ideational shift, is now characterized by “completely 
different languages and assumptions and this situation is untenable.”1
One interpretation is that the crash of 2008 produced a “balance sheet recession,” with 
global implications. Monetary policy becomes less effective in a context of a balance sheet 
recession composed of over-indebted agents and barely functioning banking systems. In this 
context, current monetary policy frameworks are not functioning in the way intended. Many 
central banks have persistently missed inflation targets with interest rates at close to zero, while 
the spectre of deflation (or very low inflation below the target) hovers over the euro zone. Mon-
etary policy is also effectively immobilized by the problem of debt overhang, which causes poli-
cymakers to worry about the potential social damage and dislocation caused by raising interest 
rates, while lowering rates brings no real prospect of increased economic activity among over-
indebted agents. This paralysis is at the heart of monetary policy stasis. There are further wor-
ries that an extraordinarily accommodative monetary stance masks the debt problem, disguis-
ing the capacity of households and businesses to service debts. Furthermore, there is a concern 
that financial intermediaries such as insurance companies and pension funds are having their 
margins squeezed by persistently low interest rates [Borio, 2011b]. The BIS [2014] has urged its 
central bank members to exit loose monetary policy, highlighting the risks of normalizing too 
late. The BIS analytical lens focuses on balance sheets and the financial cycle, and warns that 
monetary policy has prioritized rescue operations at the expense of curbing and dampening 
booms [Jones and Fleming, 2014]. Low interest rates have also weakened currencies, which, 
although playing a role in economic recovery by boosting exports, also results in the spread of 
easy money to emerging markets through resistance to exchange rate appreciation, leading to 
imported inflation and growing fears of currency wars and competitive devaluations, and other 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies in the form of rising protectionism.
In short, monetary policy is in a state of paralysis or stasis. From a range of quarters, there 
is a growing dissatisfaction that current policy frameworks have outlived their usefulness. How-
ever, change and reform cannot be effectively undertaken by national authorities acting alone 
and in isolation, not least because financial imbalances take a global form and to do so would be 
to repeat the mistakes of the micro fixation of the doctrine of keeping one’s own house in order. 
Moreover, many minds, sharing experiences and mutual learning have epistemic advantages in 
enlarging the pool of information on which to make informed decisions and also prevent states 
from moving into the difficult territory of moving alone in adjusting and challenging the status 
of their independent central banks.
The Macroprudential Ideational Shift and Monetary Policy Stasis
Previous experiences of significant financial and economic crises have led many political econ-
omists to associate such moments of distress with significant ideational change [Blyth, 2002; 
Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007; Hall, 1993]. Since 2008, ideational change has been 
most evident in the emergence of macroprudential regulation [Baker, 2013b, a]. A macropru-
dential perspective questions and overturns much of the pre-crash orthodoxy. It involves a sys-
tem-wide focus and treats financial risk as endogenous, or the result of the collective behaviour 
of institutions. Credit conditions, asset prices and the macroeconomy are seen to depend on the 
1 Confidential interview with official, February 2014.
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behaviour of the financial system as a whole. The aim is to make calculations of risk for the sys-
tem as a whole and establish solvency standards for the system, before working back from that to 
derive standards for individual institutions. Macroprudential analysis can be separated into two 
dimensions – a time dimension (how aggregate risk evolves over time) and a cross-sectional di-
mension (how risk is allocated and located within the system at a given point in time). The time 
dimension is linked to the concept of procyclicality and the notion that a macro financial cycle 
exists as a crucial source of instability. The cross-sectional dimension relates to inter-linkages 
between institutions that result in joint failures and vulnerability to common sources of risk. To 
address procyclicality, the principle is to build up buffers in good times, as aggregate risk grows, 
so that these buffers can be drawn down in bad times, as that procyclicality materializes. To ad-
dress common exposures and inter-linkages, the principle is to calibrate prudential tools with 
respect to the contribution of each institution to systemic risk, once a given level of acceptable 
risk for the system as a whole is selected. In more expansive versions of macroprudential regula-
tion, the dangers of cross-sectional vulnerabilities also bring greater calls for separation between 
commercial and investment banking, with ring fencing at the minimal end of the spectrum.
Policy has taken major strides in the macroprudential direction [Baker, 2013b, a]. The 
international community has strongly endorsed the need to establish macroprudential frame-
works [Financial Stability Forum, 2009; High-Level Group on Financial Supervision, 2009; 
G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, 2009]. International regulatory bodies have 
been strengthening the macroprudential orientation of their standards, and national and supra-
national authorities have been setting up new bodies with explicit macroprudential responsibili-
ties. A lot of work is underway to establish how best to implement the arrangements. Monitor-
ing and limiting systemic risk is now a core policy objective. The analysis of bank capital and 
liquidity requirements by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was informed 
by a top-down assessment of costs and benefits to overall output in Basel III. The BCBS has 
also introduced a countercyclical capital buffer. The capital buffer is accumulated during pe-
riods of “excessive” credit expansion, which could signal the build-up of systemic risks, and is 
released at times of incipient financial stress. The aim is to limit the amplitude of the cycle, act-
ing as a dragging anchor during the upswing and releasing capital at times of stress to constrain 
downward movements and cushion landings.
Macroprudential analysis draws closer to an older tradition, which saw financial instabil-
ity as an inherent property of an economy reflecting the close link between the financial and 
business cycles. This strand was best exemplified in the post-war work of Charles Kindleberger 
[1996] and Hyman Minsky [1982], which remained marginal in terms of the pre-crash ortho-
doxy. The work on procyclicality, in particular, was rooted in economic mechanisms that were 
almost entirely absent in the mainstream macroeconomic literature. The foundational assump-
tions behind prudential policy are now completely different to the pre-crash period. The pro-
pensity for endemic endogenous financial instability is now widely acknowledged and the equi-
librium (and efficient, rational) properties of financial markets are widely questioned. Financial 
instability and the financial cycle are now considered to be key drivers of macroeconomic per-
formance and underperformance. Regulation is seen to be a system-wide undertaking, needed 
to contain systemic risk rather than focusing on the stability of individual institutions.
It is instructive to observe this ideational shift. It was rapid and radical. BIS officials such 
as Claudio Borio, Philip Lowe and William White had tried to push macroprudential thinking 
in the pre-crash period, and undertaken important foundational conceptual work. They met 
with limited success and disinterest, bordering on hostility from central banks. Alan Green-
span was reported to be particularly unimpressed with macroprudential arguments [Balzli and 
Schiessl, 2009]. Others at the United States Federal Reserve responded that risk went up and 
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down.2 At the Bank of England, Governor Mervyn King was so focused on monetary policy 
and his inflation mandate that he gave little attention to financial stability issues. The bank’s 
financial stability team was largely marginalized in terms of the mainstream functions of the 
bank. This team did, however, conduct some in-house work that was sympathetic to the thrust 
of BIS arguments, in the mid 2000s, but chose to keep this work private because there was little 
audience for the work both inside and outside of the bank.
All this meant that when the crash reached its critical point in the autumn of 2008, there 
were already voices making the macroprudential case within the central banking community to 
whom G20 leaders turned for technical guidance and advice. Moreover, those figures within 
the central banking community who had been quietly developing a macroprudential perspec-
tive now had an opportunity to push the arguments and concepts that had been summarily 
dismissed as being unnecessary during the great moderation. Now their arguments looked ret-
rospectively prescient and the crash itself appeared to provide substantial supportive empirical 
evidence for the perspective. Recognizing that the crisis provided the moment to push their 
arguments, BIS officials embarked on a concerted and energetic advocacy campaign, forming 
alliances with academic economists such as Charles Goodhart, John Eatwell, Hyun Song Shin, 
Martin Hellwig and Markus Brunnermeier. They were joined by more vocal and supportive UK 
officials, both at the Bank of England and the FSA, and at the Bank of Canada and crucially 
the Reserve Bank of India, as well as the Bank of Spain, all of whom had some limited prior 
experience with macroprudential policy instruments [Baker, 2013b, a].
However, it was the BIS as the provider of central banking services and analysis for its 
client national central banks that had become the spiritual home of macroprudential analysis 
and argument during the first decade of the 2000s. The BIS is an unusual institution in that it 
primarily provides data and analysis to its member central banks. Unlike the IMF, it does not 
provide a service such as the provision of emergency liquidity and financing packages. This 
means that states seek to exercise less control of its analytical and intellectual work than would 
be the case in the case in the IMF, giving the BIS a greater degree of intellectual freedom and 
autonomy that is largely accepted by the central banks.3 However, at the same time, central 
banks have greater freedom to ignore BIS analysis, as it does not come as part of a conditional-
ity package attached to financial assistance, which is the IMF’s primary form of leverage. Much 
of the work the BIS conducted on macroprudential came in response to the Asian financial 
crisis. BIS officials led by Borio were determined to promote macroprudential thinking. They 
were assisted by the appointment of Jaime Caruana as general manager of the BIS in early 2009. 
As former governor of the Bank of Spain, which was the only developed country central bank to 
have operated countercyclical capital buffers with some success, Caruana supported the mac-
roprudential agenda. Moreover, he quickly recognized that establishing the approach would 
require getting it onto the G20 agenda, through the range of summit initiatives taking place dur-
ing 2009. BIS officials were successful in doing this. For one BIS official, the key breakthrough 
in cementing the macroprudential approach came with the publication of the G20’s Working 
Group on Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency [2009] on 25 March 
2009.4 The working group was co-chaired by Rakesh Mohan of the Reserve Bank of India and 
Tiff Macklem of the Bank of Canada, and made several recommendations calling for authori-
ties to be equipped with macroprudential policy instruments. In this sense, G20 support was 
essential to give political momentum to the approach. Following the report, support for a mac-
roprudential perspective was repeated in the London and Pittsburgh summit communiqués. 
2 Confidential interview with official, February 2014.
3 Confidential interview with official, Basel, February 2014.
4 Confidential correspondence, January 2012.
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This support subsequently shaped and influenced the analytical work stream of the BCBS, the 
BIS itself, the IMF and the new Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Crucially, the macroprudential case is a very good example of what the G20 does best. It 
can endorse, approve, legitimate and initiate new approaches, principles and philosophies, and 
in doing so – as the apex economic policy forum in the global system – it shapes the agendas, 
priorities and timelines of other more expert bodies in global governance and simultaneously 
empowers them by  establishing agendas and priorities [Baker, 2010; Baker and Carey, 2014]. 
In this sense, this is an example of the G20 as an apex policy forum presiding over a trajectory 
change in global financial governance, or sea change in broad approach. The G20 is able to do 
this by conferring its authority and approval to new ideas and approaches, in a way that can 
change the direction of travel in a particular policy field. This type of authority and endorse-
ment can only come from the leaders’ level [Eccleston, Kellow and Carroll, 2013]. The mac-
roprudential ideational shift was an example of such a policy change that could not have oc-
curred without G20 approval and support from the highest levels of government, but also from 
those at the pinnacle of finance ministry and central bank hierarchies. It is possible to argue 
that the G20 and Group of Eight have been presiding over a similar sea change in the tax case 
discussed by Dries Lesage in this issue. A further example has arguably come with the initiation 
of a Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), which intensifies the monitoring of global imbalances 
and acknowledges the globally interdependent nature of contemporary macroeconomic policy, 
with national authorities needing to be more aware of how one another’s actions impact on the 
overall global picture, including the negative feedback effects that can occur from the “go it 
alone” or “putting one’s own house in order” approach. This process also came out of a G20 
workshop on sustainable growth and applies many macro insights from prudential policy to the 
G20 macroeconomic debate [Butler, 2012].
While the G20 has continued to monitor regulatory agendas, its big post-crisis governance 
contribution has been in presiding over this macroprudential ideational shift. This was a direct 
consequence of the G20’s capacity to instigate and endorse such ideational shifts or sea change 
moments that only it, as a process, has the ultimate authority to oversee and signal. What was 
equally marked after the crash was how little movement and agreement there have been on how 
monetary policy should be changed to ref lect these new insights from the macroprudential per-
spective. In contrast to significant and fast-moving change in the field of regulatory prudential 
(financial stability) policy, monetary policy has been characterized by ideational inertia (Baker, 
2014). Overall policy frameworks, despite barely functioning, have not been overhauled. Exten-
sive experimentation with unorthodox policy measures in the form of quantitative easing have 
not been accompanied by revision of either the pre-existing intellectual framework or the over-
arching policy framework [Baker, 2014]. Some six years on from the crash, inflation targeting in 
its current form seems barely tenable as a guiding policy target or frame. Notably, there has been 
no significant G20 discussion of monetary policy frameworks despite mounting discontent and 
questions about their viability.
There are reasons to believe that central banks themselves have had incentives to keep a 
discussion of monetary policy frameworks away from the G20 agenda. For BIS officials, the 
readiness of central banks to accept a new macroprudential policy framework is partly explained 
by their reluctance to change their monetary policy frameworks.5 In other words, from a central 
bank perspective the introduction of a macroprudential tool kit would address financial stability 
issues, taking the pressure off monetary policy and freeing it to focus on price stability. Central 
banks have prospered from current thinking in monetary policy because having operationally 
independent central banks meeting inflation targets was largely justified by the assumption that 
5 Confidential interview with official, February 2014.
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it was necessary to counter time inconsistency by signalling “good future intentions” to rational 
economic agents [Balls, 1998]. Moreover, senior central bankers have invested much of their 
careers in rationalizing and developing inflation targeting regimes, including formal modelling. 
They were not keen to ditch these framework after the crash, or even to open a debate about 
reconsidering them. However, as evidence of anomalies in existing frameworks mounts and 
accumulates, so pressure on central bankers to change tack is growing and to re-evaluate mon-
etary policy frameworks.
Two Critical Perspectives on Current Monetary Policy
Two emerging distinctive positions on future monetary policy frameworks appear to be com-
peting with one another. One of these is a BIS Austrian/early monetarist position, and the 
second a softer monetary Keynesian IMF position. The BIS position is slightly more nuanced 
than it first appears. The starting premise is that monetary policy cannot focus exclusively on 
the control of short-run inflation, but has to systematically take financial cycles into account. 
In this regard, the BIS analysis calls for tightening monetary policy to restrain the build-up of 
financial imbalances, in a pre-emptive fashion, even if near-term inflation is contained [Borio, 
2011a, b; BIS 2014]. This entails extending the policy horizon beyond two years and examin-
ing a wider balance of financial risks. The BIS position is for these risks to be assessed in terms 
of joint deviations of credit and asset prices, especially property prices, from historical trends. 
From the BIS perspective, this involves identifying the symptoms that raise serious risks for 
the macroeconomy. This perspective is accompanied by a claim that equilibrium notions such 
as natural rates of interest and unemployment are, in fact, fuzzy and much more difficult to 
measure, whereas ratios of credit to gross domestic product are relatively straightforward to op-
erationalize. Because monetary policy sets the universal price of leverage in a given jurisdiction, 
it is viewed as an essential part of the tool kit for managing the financial cycle and avoids the 
possibility for regulatory arbitrage. Under its current reading, the BIS sees financial markets as 
extraordinarily buoyant because of ultra low monetary policy being pursued around the world, 
and argues that monetary policy plays a role in halting the rise in debt burdens around the world 
[BIS 2014; Jones and Fleming, 2014].
The BIS position essentially calls for is balanced approach in which all policies – mon-
etary, fiscal and macroprudential – play a mutually supportive role in restraining financial 
booms in a form of hard countercyclical management of the system as a whole. The basic idea 
is for policies to be more symmetric across the boom-and-bust phases of financial cycles. Poli-
cies would lean more deliberately against booms and then ease less aggressively and persistently 
during busts of a balance sheet nature. Scarce ammunition could then be used more effectively 
to hasten the recovery, by providing more scope for monetary easing in busts, but also by limit-
ing balance sheet disrepair during booms. The basic BIS position is that the financial cycle re-
mains absent from current macroeconomic policy frameworks and this is like a play without its 
main character – Hamlet without the prince [Borio, 2011b]. While prudential policy (financial 
stability) has rediscovered the financial cycle, the same cannot be said of macroeconomic and 
monetary policy. This is what the BIS wishes to rectify.
Meanwhile, Olivier Blanchard [2010] and colleagues at the IMF have argued for a higher 
inflation target rising to 4%. Other IMF analysis has pointed out how excessive “lowflation” 
can be problematic for financially stressed countries, where it implies higher real debt stocks 
and real interest rates combined with less relative price adjustment and greater unemployment 
[Moghadam, Teja and Berkmen, 2014]. There is now a belief that advanced economies are far 
more likely to hit the zero lower bound limit of inflation, and remain closer to it than previously 
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believed, and that the economic costs of that constraint on conventional monetary policy are 
much larger than the pre-crisis conventional wisdom [Krugman, 2014]. Notably, less-than-
previously-expected inflation increases the real burden of existing debt. There is, for example, 
a high correlation in the euro zone between high debt burdens and lower than expected inflation 
and even deflation. Low inflation delivers less exchange rate and price adjustment for countries 
with high debts. The basic proposition is that an inflation target that may have been defensible 
two decades ago is arguably much less defensible now. In January 2014, Christine Lagarde 
[2014], managing director of the IMF, warned that deflation was the ogre haunting the global 
economy. In contrast, the BIS [2014] considers the risk of persistent and outright falling prices 
to be low.
In short, there is widespread discontent with the current regime from various branches of 
analytical apparatus that underpins global financial governance, albeit from different perspec-
tives. Nonetheless, intense resistance remains from central bankers to regime change, even after 
more than half a decade in which interest rate have been close to zero. Moreover, this resistance 
persists even in the face of mounting criticism and anomalies in what appears to be a largely 
redundant and non-functioning and immobilized existing policy framework.
G20 Commitments, Governance and Accountability
Monetary policy has not featured prominently recently on the G20 agenda. It was mentioned in 
only two of the four communiqués issued by the G20 finance ministers and central bank gover-
nors in 2014. Policy had to remain “accommodative” in the medium term, with an expectation 
that it would normalize in due course, reducing the global economy’s reliance on easy money 
policy [G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, 2014]. The thrust of the statement 
was non-committal and the very possibility that existing policy frameworks maybe f lawed and 
problematic was not even acknowledged. Essentially, the G20’s stance on monetary policy has 
been to continue to muddle through.
Nevertheless, the perception that monetary policy is fundamentally broken remains a 
strong one and serious analytical work is demonstrating this in the wider institutions outside of 
the G20. One of the key patterns in global governance, as the macroprudential case illustrated, 
is that G20 diplomacy is not just about states trying to influence one or another, or the G20 
itself trying to steer wider sets of institutions. It is also about experts trying to shape the G20 and 
obtain support, prestige, legitimacy, approval and profile for their own ongoing work. The cur-
rent priority for BIS staff, who were so successful in moving the financial stability consensus, is 
to move the consensus on monetary policy in the same way. A form of advocacy campaign on 
monetary policy is already underway at the BIS.6 Part of this strategy will undoubtedly be to get 
the G20 to think more seriously about monetary policy. In the language of the BIS, the lessons 
learned in the area of financial stability need to be extended across to monetary policy and the 
two areas need to be much more closely linked and integrated.7 The latest reorganization at the 
Bank of England, with personnel swapped between monetary and financial policy committees, 
is a very partial attempted step in this direction, even if the bank’s own position is to persist with 
inflation targeting, with a recent analysis suggesting monetary tightening is still some way off 
due to the conflicting trends the British economy is displaying [Haldane, 2014].
Probably the most impressive and useful aspect of G20 governance to date has been its use 
of working groups. These expert groupings have forwarded innovative policy proposals since the 
financial crash. In terms of effectively advancing and moving the international consensus for-
6 Confidential interview with official, February 2014.
7 Confidential interview with official, February 2014.
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ward, they have the best track record. G20 working groups were pivotal in forwarding both the 
macroprudential shift and introducing the MAP, which has at least allowed for more structured 
and sustained dialogue on the issue of global imbalances in accordance with an agreed ana-
lytical framework [Butler, 2012]. A G20 working group to discuss and prepare a report on the 
long-term future of monetary policy is urgently needed. At least then high-level international 
debate on monetary policy can move beyond muddling through statements and actions (such as 
so-called forward guidance in the British case) and hoping for the best. But without interven-
tion and direction from the G20, including convening a working group with full representation 
from the IMF and the BIS and their very different analytical positions, the current stasis on 
monetary policy is likely to persist.
The G20 matters in global governance for its ability to initiate trajectory changes in global 
governance and catalyze new thinking. Central banks play a big role in G20 preparations and 
deliberations within the network of finance ministers and central bank governors, but are less 
involved in preparing for the summit process, which is handled mainly by the leaders’ personal 
representatives – the sherpas – but with some input from finance ministers and their deputies. 
Left to their own devices, central banks will continue to stumble along in an experimental fash-
ion in a belief that a return to the old pre-crash policy frameworks and approaches will come 
sooner rather than later. In a sense they have had an incentive to keep monetary policy off the 
G20 leaders’ agenda. But, six years after the crash, with little sign of current policy frameworks 
returning to their originally intended function, the time has come for a fundamental review 
and brainstorming exercise about the future role of monetary policy. Evidence is mounting in 
that direction, but so too is pressure from those working seriously on monetary policy outside 
national central banks, at the IMF and the BIS.
The G20, with its high-level authority and its position as global apex policy forum with the 
involvement of leaders and finance ministers, should recognize the signals coming from these 
institutions. G20 members should effectively call their own central banks to account, by ask-
ing them to ref lect systematically and collectively about what the last decade has taught them 
about monetary policy, and to discuss the analysis emerging from these institutions and report 
back. The summit process can do this by instigating a working group on the future of monetary 
policy. A full, frank, candid and – most crucially of all – pluralistic and evidence-led review 
of monetary policy is urgently needed. The G20 can and should instigate and preside over this. 
In this sense, the issue of how to call central banks to account is complicated by their apparent 
independence based on a delegation contract in which central banks are tasked with meeting an 
inflation target. Moreover, as a profession, central banking increasingly displays the character-
istics of a phenomenon that Martin Marcussen [2006] refers to as “scientization” – a striking 
intellectualization of the world via formal analysis and mathematical abstraction. One of the 
consequences of this process of scientization is that central bankers make epistemic alliances 
with other members of the scientific brotherhood; their research departments finance their own 
scientific journals and conferences as scientific credentials enhance careers for central bankers 
who increasingly possess doctoral degrees in economics and engage directly with the scientific 
community [Marcussen, 2006, p. 9]. A further symptom is that central banks’ organizational, 
territorial and cultural boundaries are blurring as co-equal central bankers work closely to-
gether from project to project [Marcussen, 2006, p. 10]. From this perspective, central banking 
increasingly consists of “knowledge communities,” or transnational epistemic clan structures 
constructed around inter-paradigmatic discussions about theory, methods and data. As central 
banking has effectively globalized in terms of how to construct knowledge and notions of best 
practice, so too must efforts to call central banking, as a transnational profession, to account 
and direct its activities. For these reasons, governments have limited capacity to go it alone.
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Within the G20’s series of overlapping networks, central bankers are clearly represented, 
but so too are leaders and finance ministers, which gives the G20 a capacity to instigate a review 
of current monetary policy practice, particularly at the leaders’ level, where the central bankers 
are not involved. One view is that nothing the leaders say is binding for independent central 
banks. This maybe true of day-to-day policy matters, including setting interest rate policy, over 
which central banks do have operational control and independence. However, the overarching 
monetary policy framework of inflation targeting was created and approved by politicians. In 
this sense, the G20 summit as meeting of leaders with the input of finance ministers can call 
on the central banks and other expert groups to review current monetary policy frameworks 
and to report back, accounting for the current underperformance and considering proposals for 
change to those frameworks. In this way, the G20 and its political leaders can respond to the 
transnational nature of central banking and call constituent central banks to account, by insti-
gating a ref lexive appraisal of existing practice.
The G20 has also displayed considerable f lexibility through its working group format 
[Baker and Carey, 2014], where it has been possible to extend membership to a wider range of 
experts and stakeholders. By convening a working group on monetary policy, the G20 can con-
duct a thorough review and reflection on contemporary monetary policy, which is not restrict-
ed to the central banks themselves, but would bring a range of competing expert voices to the 
table. This is particularly important in the current era because some scholars have speculated 
that an era of “central bank – led capitalism” has dawned, in which central bank interventions 
have gone beyond traditional function of lender of last resort in providing significant financial 
support to the financial sector, but have also had major distributive consequences and amount 
to a form of banker welfare [Bowman Erturk Froud et al., 2012–13]. Consequently, there is a 
strong case for arguing that their actions need to be subjected to social criticism and brought 
under political control harnessing central bank expertise for the social objective of better social-
ized debt management [Bowman Erturk Froud et al., 2012–13, pp. 486–76].
Conclusions
After the financial crash of 2008, monetary policy throughout most of the G20 has displayed the 
exceptional features of very low interest rates (close to zero in many cases), largely ineffectual 
and seemingly increasingly redundant inflation targets (with inflation first overshooting, then 
undershooting, targets) and a series of asset-purchasing policies to support heavily indebted in-
stitutions and financial systems. This article has argued that consequently monetary policy has 
appeared to be paralyzed with short-term interest rates frozen at record low levels and inflation 
targets persistently missed. Moreover, this situation has now persisted for six years. Monetary 
policy has been in stasis and unable to return to business as usual. In the meantime, questions 
have been raised by international organizations about the viability of the monetary policy status 
quo. Yet, in this context, central banks have remained reluctant to move formally away from 
inflation targeting, or to review the medium-term objectives of monetary policy. Central banks 
could, of course, be the most immediate losers from such a review. The G20 therefore have 
a role to play in calling their constituent central banks to account, by instigating a far-reach-
ing review of monetary policy frameworks that considers what viable medium-term monetary 
policy frameworks would look like. The G20’s post-crash policy successes have emerged from 
the authoritative findings of working groups, which have been successful in instigating crucial 
trajectory changes in financial regulation. As the BIS has noted, however, the lessons learned 
in financial regulation have not travelled to monetary policy, which has been characterized 
by muddling through rather than by systematic lesson drawing. A high-level technical debate 
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about the future of monetary policy is urgently needed. The G20 can and should instigate such 
a debate by convening a specialist working group on monetary policy. This would raise ques-
tions about greater democratic control of central banks at a time when their policies appear to 
have had clear distributive implications and would raise serious questions about their capacity 
to maintain political legitimacy.
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